Research

JMP

• Kei Ikegami, Bargaining over Leasing Contracts (New draft: June 19, 2025)
  Short Summary

  This paper investigates how kinked revenue-sharing contracts are negotiated and how they embed bargaining power. Using proprietary panel data on tenant contracts and sales in shopping malls, I estimate a structural model in which a risk-averse tenant and mall renegotiate contracts based on realized sales. The results show that the mall-to-tenant power ratio shapes contract terms through two channels: (i) risk posture—powerful malls can insist on low-variance, high-fixed-rent contracts; and (ii) sales expectations—pessimistic forecasts cap fixed rent and shift weight to commissions. Because these forces offset, contract form alone seldom signals power imbalance. Counterfactual simulations imposing fairer bargaining weights indicate that, after risk adjustment, total rent can triple even when the mall is relatively weak.
  Presentations

  ESWC 2025, IIOC 2025, APIOC 2024, UTMD rising star in market design, NYU seminar
  slide (Update: May 13, 2025)

Publication

• Kei Ikegami, Kyohei Okumura, and Takumi Yoshikawa, A Simple, Fast, and Safe Mediator for Congestion Management, AAAI '20 (Oral and Poster presentation)
• Kei Ikegami, Ken Onishi, and Naoki Wakamori, Competition-Driven Physician-Induced Demand, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 79, September 2021

Working Paper

• Kei Ikegami, Atsushi Iwasaki, Akira Matsushita, and Kyohei Okumura, Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities (New draft: July 7, 2025) Accepted for EC'25 (Exemplary paper award for the Empirics track)

  Short Summary

  Cap-based regulations are widely used to address distributional disparities in matching markets, but their efficiency relative to alternative instruments such as subsidies remains poorly understood. This paper develops a framework for evaluating policy interventions by incorporating regional constraints into a transferable utility matching model. We show that a policymaker with aggregate-level match data can implement a taxation policy that maximizes social welfare and outperforms any cap-based policy. Using newly collected data from the Japan Residency Matching Program, we estimate participant preferences and simulate counterfactual match outcomes under both cap-based and subsidy-based policies. The results reveal that the status quo cap-based regulation generates substantial efficiency losses, whereas small, targeted subsidies can achieve similar distributional goals with significantly higher social welfare.
  Presentations

  SITE 2025, EC 2025, IIOC 2025, APIOC 2024, NYU seminar, JEA annual meeting 2024

• Kei Ikegami, Ken Onishi, and Naoki Wakamori, Joint Venture Formation in Procurement Auctions (New draft: Oct 23, 2024)

  Short Summary

  We propose a model for joint venture formation in the context of procurement auctions. This model enables us to identify the formation mechanism, which is necessary for simulating counterfactual auction settings. We estimate the model using newly collected Japanese procurement auction data. Our estimates reveal the presence of cost synergies: joint ventures are more likely to be cost-effective compared to standard bidders. Despite this pro-competitive effect, our simulation indicates that excessive encouragement of joint ventures hinders cost-effective procurement by reducing competition. This anti-competitive effect arises from the diminished incentive to enter the auction due to the possibility to compete with joint ventures.
  Presentations

  AEA 2024, Otaru University of Commerce, Yokohama National University, NYU seminar, APIOC 2022

• Kei Ikegami, Resource Procurement for Matching Market: A Nash-in-Nash Approach

  Short Summary

  This paper examines the procurement of resources for a subsequent matching market. We present a three-stage model: 1) bilateral bargaining between procurers and resource suppliers, 2) suppliers' decisions on resource provision, and 3) the realization of a stable matching outcome. We adopt the Nash-in-Nash approach as the solution concept for bargaining, revealing a unique equilibrium where procurers are unable to incentivize suppliers, resulting in minimal procurement. However, we demonstrate that by committing to an assignment rule that reverses the order of assignment, the government can increase the number of procured resources in equilibrium. Our findings emphasize the social benefits of integrating the allocation and procurement problems.

• Kei Ikegami and Hikaru Kawarazaki, Social Learning in Budget Formulation: A Case of Adaptation to Natural Disasters

  Short Summary

  This paper studies social learning among policymakers when formulating a budget. Focusing on the disaster prevention policy, we model local governments’ expenditures as a response to the expected future disaster risk. Through this model, we associate the correlation of the expenditures between local governments with the connection in the social learning about the risk. We use Japanese administrative data over 20 years to estimate a sparse social learning network. Moreover, as the network formation determinants, we find significant effects of (1) the inflow of internal migration between local governments, (2) the risk of future earthquakes, and (3) the risk preference of the local citizens.
  Presentations

  KCL, UCL, IFS, GRIP, AASLE Annual Conference at the University of Tokyo, and the Applied Econometric Conference at Waseda University

Work in Progress

• Kei Ikegami and Kan Kuno, Wage Stagnation in Daycare Industry: A Two-Sided Market Perspective